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New systemic risk centre at LSE
• Funded by the ESRC
• I am co–director along with Jean–Pierre Zigrand
• Formal start expected in November
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Papers
• with with Kevin R. James, Marcela Valenzuela and Ilknur
Zer
• “Model Risk of Systemic Risk Models”
• “Dealing With Systemic Risk when We Measure It
Badly”
• with Hyun Song Shin and Jean–Pierre Zigrand
• “Endogenous and Systemic Risk”
• “Endogenous Extreme Events and the Dual Role of
Prices”
Introduction Sysrisk Models Analysis
Proliferation of systemic risk measures
• Office of Financial Research, January 5, 2012, A Survey
of Systemic Risk Analytics, Bisias, Flood, Lo and
Valavanis survey 31 SysRisk measures
• Many new since then
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Some approaches
• Accounting and balance sheet information
• Interbank and other network linkages
• Exposure
• Financial market data
• equity markets
• bonds and CDS
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Key questions
1. Can a systemic risk measure beat the Financial Times?
• Every indicator seems to flash at the same time
2. Is 2007/ 2008 really the right benchmark?
• We don’t know the nature of the next crisis, but it will
be different from this one
• Excessively calibrating models and analysis to 2007/2008
not advisable
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Systemic risk models that build
on existing market risk
methodologies
some might say they failed
before the crisis, but...
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Systemic risk from market risk models
• Ri is risky outcomes of institution i
• RS is outcomes from the entire financial system
• Joint distribution is:
f (Ri ,RS)
• Marginal density is f (Ri), and the two conditional
densities are f (Ri |RS) and f (RS |Ri)
• VaR, (where Q is a quantile)
pr[Ri ≤ Qi ] = p
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Common measures
these things are much more similar than often maintained
Marginal
risk
measure Condition on system Condition on institution
MVaR CoVaR
VaR pr[Ri ≤ Qi |RS ≤ QS ] = p pr[RS ≤ QS |Ri ≤ Qi ] = p
MES CoES
ES E[Ri |RS ≤ QS ] E[RS |Ri ≤ Qi ]
• Other measures like Shapley fit into this
• All depend on daily VaR and have more model risk than
VaR
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Data
• Daily total returns January 1997–December 2010 (+
some state variables for CoVaR)
• 92 largest US financial institutions
• Here four representative stocks: Bank of New York
Mellon (BK), JP Morgan Chase& Co. (JPM), State
Street (STT) and US Bancorp (USB)
• Full results and all code for estimation can (will) be found
in the Webappendix, www.RiskResearch.org/sysrisk
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VaR
• Forecast 99% VaR with the most widely used
state–of–the–art methods
• HS, MW, student-t MW, EWMA, GARCH and student-t
GARCH
• Range of estimation windows (500, 1000, 1500)
• $1000 portfolio
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Ratio of highest to lowest daily 1% VaR
End of quarter results. Probability is 1%
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JP Morgan highest and lowest VaR
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Usefulness of pre-crisis data: JPM
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Immediate conclusion
• State–of–the–art market risk models are highly inaccurate
• Just by tweaking the model I can make VaR be $100,
$200 or $300, using only models accepted by the
supervisors
• Model risk much higher during extreme turmoil
• Model risk much higher at systematically important
probabilities
• To me this suggests market risk approaches are not
appropriate for systemic risk
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Analysis
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When risk is created
Former head of the BIS, Andrew Crockett in 2000
“The received wisdom is that risk increases in recessions and
falls in booms. In contrast, it may be more helpful to think of
risk as increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances
build up, and materialising in recessions.”
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Assumptions behind almost every risk and
pricing model known
Joint with Hyun Song Shin and Jean–Pierre Zigrand
• Risk is exogenous (we are strictly price takers)
• Market prices are the best reflection of value
• Today’s price has most information
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If true, consequently
• The best way to forecast risk (even prices) is to combine
a historical sample of prices
• With a model like EWMA, HS, IV, GARCH, etc. . . .
• Best to down weigh history
• Price dynamics in a crisis belong to the same stochastic
process as price dynamics outside of crisis
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However . . .
• Risk is really endogenous
• Prices reflect constraints (margins, capital, politics, etc.)
• These effects are stronger during crises
• Forces driving prices and risk are different in a crisis than
out of crisis
• The underlying economic process may be the same, but
we are talking statistics
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Dual role of prices
• They are a passive reflection of the underlying economic
fundamentals, an aggregation of all available information
but on the other
• Also an imperative to action
• Implications (see next slide)
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Role of prices
• Market prices during periods of calm are a poor input into
forecast models
• They are not informative about the distribution of prices
that follow after a crisis is triggered
• Price dynamics during one crisis may be quite different in
the next, limiting the ability to draw inference from crisis
events
Risk models underestimate risk during calm times and
overestimate risk during crisis — they get it wrong in all states
of the world
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Systemic risk forecasting
• Market variables as indication of the risk of future
systemic event
• Systemic risk is concerned with events that happen during
crisis conditions, looking far into the tails of distributions
• Little relevant data
• Over the last fifty or so years we have observed less than
a dozen episodes of extreme international market
turmoil, all unique
• Models that are fed with inputs from calm periods will
perform much less well during periods of stress
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Quality control for systemic risk measures
1. Point forecasts are not sufficient: need confidence
intervals incorporating both estimation risk and model risk
2. Data should be predictive and not reactive
3. Statistical method needs to include backtesting
4. Event probabilities need to correspond with the
probability of systemic events
• If such events happen once every 10 years, 99%
probabilities (2.5 times a year) are of little relevance
• One can not map failure probabilities from less extreme
to more extreme. (estimate at 99% use for 99.9%)
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Is a bad systemic risk measure better than
none?
• Current systemic risk measures are quite bad, perhaps
indistinguishable from random noise or at best weakly
better in prediction
• High cost of using an incorrect method
• A bad systemic risk measure should not be acceptable for
policy purposes, it should be of a proven quality
• Type 2 errors are very costly (falsely finding high sysrisk)
• Avoid the fallacy of requiring a number for
decision–making regardless of the number quality
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So . . .
• A different class of models (currently mostly nonexistent)
is required to forecast extremes or crises or systemic risk
• From a fundamental economic point of view the financial
system may follow the same economic process over time
• From a practical and statistical point of view the
stochastic processes are different in crisis and non–crisis
• Each crisis event has different statistical properties
• Systemic risk modelling is in its infancy
